Arbitrating Consumer Claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act by Wiechens, Katie
Arbitrating Consumer Claims under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
Katie Wiechenst
Suppose a consumer wants to buy a new mobile home. As part of
the sale the manufacturer provides a written warranty, in which he
promises to compensate the consumer if certain defects in the home
arise within a specified time period. Suppose further that the warranty
contains an arbitration clause. The clause requires the consumer to
submit any claim arising under the warranty to binding arbitration.
The consumer signs the agreement and purchases the home. Later, the
consumer complains of defects in her new home, claiming that the
warranty entitles her to compensation. The manufacturer objects to
the consumer's claim. Is the consumer bound by her agreement to ar-
bitrate the warranty claims, or may she disregard the agreement and
pursue her claims in a judicial forum?
The answer to this question turns on the resolution of the conflict
between two federal statutes: the Federal Arbitration Act' ("FAA'')
and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act' ("MMWA"). The FAA states
that agreements to submit disputes to arbitration "shall be valid, ir-
revocable, and enforceable."3 Thus, if the FAA applies to the preced-
ing scenario without qualification, the consumer must arbitrate her
claims according to the agreement. The MMWA, on the other hand,
regulates consumer warranties such as this one and specifically pro-
vides for certain "informal dispute settlement procedures."5 If the
MMWA is understood to create an exception to the FAA's general
mandate, the arbitration agreement is void, and the consumer is free
to pursue her claim in a judicial forum.
Despite the FAA's all-encompassing language, the United States
Supreme Court has held that it does not apply where "Congress in-
tended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue. ' 6 Under Shearson/American Express, Inc v McMahon,
t B.A. 1998, Northwestern University; J.D. 2001, The University of Chicago.
1 Pub L No 68-401, 43 Stat 883 (1925), codified as amended at 9 USC § 1 et seq (1994).
2 Pub L No 93-637,88 Stat 2183 (1975), codified at 15 USC § 2301 et seq (1994).
3 9 USC § 2 (1994).
4 See, for example, Shearson/American Express, Inc v McMahon, 482 US 220, 226 (1987)
(stating that "[t]he Arbitration Act, standing alone, therefore mandates enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate statutory claims").
5 15 USC § 2310(a) (1994).
6 McMahon, 482 US at 227, citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc,
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courts consider three factors to determine whether Congress intended
to exclude a particular statutory claim from the FAA's mandate:
(1) the text of the statute; (2) its legislative history; or (3) whether
there is "an inherent conflict" between arbitration and the statute's
underlying purposes.8
The Supreme Court has not yet considered how the McMahon
framework applies to the MMWA. In brief, the MMWA regulates the
content of consumer warranties and allows a consumer to bring a civil
action for breach of warranty.9 Significantly, the MMWA also allows
manufacturers to establish "informal dispute settlement procedures,"
which must be exhausted before a consumer can bring a claim in
court. '° These dispute settlement procedures must meet certain mini-
mum standards established by the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC")." The FTC, in turn, has promulgated regulations stating that
binding arbitration agreements are not "informal dispute settlement
procedure[s]," and are therefore disallowed under the MMWA."
The lower federal and state courts that have considered the issue
are divided on whether the MMWA satisfies the requirements of
McMahon and, therefore, creates an exception to the FAA." Applica-
473 US 614, 628 (1985) (noting that congressional intent regarding protection against waiver of
the right to a judicial forum can be deduced from the text and legislative history).
7 482 US 220 (1987) (holding respondents failed to meet burden of proof to show that
Congress intended to preclude a waiver of the statutory rights in question, and thus respon-
dents' Securities Exchange Act and RICO claims were arbitrable).
8 Id at 227, citing Mitsubishi Motors, 473 US at 628, 632-37 (finding the purpose of en-
forcing antitrust laws with treble damage claims does necessitate invalidating arbitration
clause); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc v Byrd, 470 US 213,218-21 (1985) (finding that arbitration of
state law claims does not represent a conflict undermining congressional intent).
9 15 USC § 2310(d)(1).
10 Id § 2310(a)(3).
11 Id § 2310(a)(2).
12 16 CFR § 700.8 (2000) (noting that warrantors shall not indicate in any written war-
ranty that the decision of any third party is final or binding); 16 CFR § 703.5(j) (2000) (noting
that decisions of the informal dispute settlement procedure are not legally binding on any per-
son); Federal Trade Commission Rules, Regulations, Statements and Interpretations under
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 40 Fed Reg 60168, 60211 (1975) (noting that "reference within
the written warranty to any binding, non-judicial remedy is prohibited by the Rule and the
[Magnuson-Moss Warranty] Act"). See also Part II.B for a more detailed discussion of the FTC
regulations.
13 Compare Pitchford v Oakwood Mobile Homes Inc, 124 F Supp 2d 958,962-65 (W D Va
2000) (holding that the arbitration agreement provision of a purchase contract was unenforce-
able under the MMWA's clear intent to encourage alternate dispute settlement procedures
while not depriving any party of the right to have her warranty dispute heard in a judicial fo-
rum); Raesly v Grand Housing, Inc, 105 F Supp 2d 562, 573 (S D Miss 2000) (holding that the
MMWA forbids binding arbitration of a dispute arising from express written warranties); and
Wilson v Waverlee Homes, Inc, 954 F Supp 1530,1539 (M D Ala 1997), affd, 127 F3d 40 (11th Cir
1997) (holding that the binding arbitration clauses contained in a sales contract are impermissi-
ble under the MMWA), with In re American Homestar of Lancaster, Inc, 50 SW3d 480,490 (Tex
2001) (holding that nothing in MMWA's text, legislative history, or purposes precludes enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements); Results Oriented, Inc v Crawford, 245 Ga App 432, 538 SE2d
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tion of McMahon to the MMWA's text, legislative history, and pur-
poses alone is insufficient to evince congressional intent to bar arbi-
tration of MMWA claims.4 Thus, the primary reason for the conflict
among courts is disagreement about what role the FTC regulations
should play in deciphering Congress's intent under McMahon." For
example, some courts consider the FTC regulations as evidence of
Congress's intent to exclude MMWA claims from the FAA's pro-
arbitration mandate and hold that agreements to arbitrate MMWA
claims are unenforceable.'6 Meanwhile, other courts refuse to consider
the FTC regulations when applying McMahon because they find the
FTC's interpretation of the MMWA on the merits is flawed.'7 All of
these courts have upheld the arbitrability of MMWA claims." Neither
courts nor commentators, however, have examined whether the regu-
lations, even if a sound interpretation of the MMWA, are appropriate
indicia of Congress's intent under the McMahon test.
This Comment proposes that courts should not consider the FTC
regulations under McMahon at all. Specifically, this Comment argues
that Congress did not delegate the power to exclude MMWA claims
from arbitration when it enacted the MMWA. Rather, this Comment
proposes that when an agency interpretation of a statute places that
73, 79-81 (2000) (holding that the MMWA does not preclude a manufacturer from arbitrating
purchaser's express and implied warranty claims unless the purchaser could show that the arbi-
tration clause was unconscionable), affd as Crawford v Results Oriented, Inc, 273 Ga 884 (2001);
Southern Energy Homes, Inc v Ard, 772 S2d 1131, 1135 (Ala 2000) (holding the arbitration pro-
visions of a written warranty binding and adopting Justice See's dissent in Southern Energy
Homes, Inc v Lee, 732 S2d 994, 1004-13 (Ala 1999), thereby overruling the majority holding in
Lee); and Southern Energy Homes, Inc v McCray, 2000 Ala LEXIS 524, *4-5 (holding that un-
der the authority of Ard, the MMWA did not invalidate arbitration clauses in a written warranty
issued by a manufacturer of consumer goods).
14 This Comment argues that courts should exclude the FTC regulations from the McMa-
hon test. A thorough application of the McMahon test once the regulations are excluded is be-
yond the scope of the Comment. Nevertheless, the conclusion that courts would uphold arbitra-
tion of MMWA claims under McMahon were it not for the regulations is justified by the Chev-
ron USA Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984), analysis in Part
III.A.2. McMahon's three factors-text, legislative history, and purposes-are the same tools of
statutory construction used in that Part to conclude that the regulations are not entitled to judi-
cial deference under Chevron. Because under Chevron these three tools of construction prove
that the MMWA cannot be understood to delegate to the FTC the authority to preclude arbitra-
tion, they prove also that the MMWA itself cannot be understood to preclude arbitration under
McMahon.
15 See Part II.C.
16 See, for example, Pitchford, 124 F Supp 2d at 964-65; Raesly, 105 F Supp 2d at 573; Wil-
son, 954 F Supp at 1539.
17 See, for example, Ard, 772 S2d at 1135 (adopting Justice See's dissent in Lee, 732 S2d at
1011-12, in which Justice See found that the FTC regulations were not entitled to judicial defer-
ence under Chevron because the Supreme Court had rejected the FTC's rationale behind the
ban on arbitration-as necessary to remedy inequality in bargaining power-in McMahon, 482
US at 230-32).
18 See, for example, Ard, 772 S2d at 1135; McCray, 2000 Ala LEXIS 524 at *4-5 (refusing
to overturn Ard); Results Oriented, 538 SE2d at 81 (incorporating analysis from Ard).
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statute in direct conflict with the FAA, the agency's interpretation is
not relevant under McMahon unless the agency is acting pursuant to
an explicit delegation from Congress.
Part I provides an overview of the FAA and discusses application
of the McMahon test. Part II describes the MMWA's key provisions
and highlights the competing approaches lower federal and state
courts have taken to resolve the tension between the two statutes. In
particular, this Part discusses how these courts treat the FTC regula-
tions when applying McMahon. Part III recommends that courts
should not consider the FTC regulations when deciding whether Con-
gress intended to prohibit binding arbitration of MMWA claims be-
cause the MMWA does not delegate to the FTC the decision to pre-
clude arbitration of MMWA claims. Part III then analyzes the impli-
cations of excluding the FTC regulations from the McMahon inquiry.
I. THE FAA: A STRONG FEDERAL POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION
The FAA mandates that agreements to arbitrate "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract."19 In effect, the FAA
acts as a default rule, requiring enforcement of agreements to arbi-
trate any statutory claim absent contrary congressional command. The
McMahon test is the tool that courts use to determine whether Con-
gress has, in fact, overcome the default rule by creating an exception
to the FAA's pro-arbitration presumption.0 This Part discusses the
history of the FAA, the Supreme Court's adoption and application of
McMahon, and the Court's treatment of agency interpretations under
the McMahon framework.
A. Overview of the FAA
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925.21 Before that time, courts had
consistently refused to enforce arbitration agreements, carefully
guarding their dispute resolution function.2 The FAA attempted to
reverse this long history of judicial hostility to arbitration by placing
arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts."
''
Put simply, the FAA reflects the "congressional desire to enforce
agreements into which parties [have] entered."24
19 9USC§ 2.
20 See Part I.B.
21 43 Stat at 883-86.
22 See Joseph T. McLaughlin, Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United States, 59 Albany
L Rev 905, 906 (1996) (noting the "long standing judicial hostility towards arbitration").
23 To Validate Certain Agreements for Arbitration, HR Rep No 96, 68th Cong, 1st Sess 1
(1924).
24 Dean Witter Reynolds Inc v Byrd, 470 US 213,220 (1985).
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To this end, the FAA provides that agreements to submit dis-
putes to arbitration "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.2' That is, as long as an arbitration agreement is a valid
contract under applicable state law, a trial court must refuse to hear
claims subject to the agreement and must issue an order compelling
the arbitration.26 Since its enactment in 1925, the FAA has successfully
encouraged the enforcement of arbitration agreements. The Supreme
Court has consistently interpreted the FAA as "a congressional decla-
ration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements."27
Moreover, the Court has held that the FAA creates a strong presump-
tion in favor of arbitration, stating "any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.. ' .
B. Defining the FAA's Limits: The McMahon Test
Although the FAA embodies a strong federal policy favoring ar-
bitration, its mandate is not absolute. The FAA does not apply where
"Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judi-
cial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."29 Thus, the FAA acts as
a default rule, requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements, ex-
cept where Congress has specifically exempted a particular statutory
claim from its application."
Courts consider three factors to determine whether Congress in-
tended to prohibit agreements to arbitrate a particular statutory
claim: (1) the text of the statute; (2) its legislative history; or (3)
whether there is "an inherent conflict between arbitration and the
statute's underlying purposes."3' The burden is on the party opposing
arbitration to demonstrate that Congress intended to preclude arbi-
tration."
25 9 USC § 2.
26 9 USC § 3 (1994) (directing the court to stay the trial on application of one of the par-
ties); 9 USC § 4 (1994) (requiring the court to direct the parties to arbitration).
27 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corp, 460 US 1, 24 (1983),
citing 9 USC § 2. See also Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 US 20, 26 (1991) (finding
that while not all statutory claims may be appropriate for arbitration, a party who has agreed to
arbitration should be held to the agreement unless Congress has shown an intent to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue); Perry v Thomas, 482 US 483, 489
(1987) (noting that § 2 declares a liberal federal policy that favors arbitration agreements).
28 Moses H. Cone, 460 US at 24-25.
29 Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 US 614,628 (1985).
30 See McMahon, 482 US at 226 (explaining that "[tihe Arbitration Act, standing alone ...
mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims").
31 Id at 227. In McMahon, the Supreme Court held that agreements to arbitrate Securities
Exchange Act and civil RICO claims are enforceable under the FAA. Id at 238, 242. See Part
I.C for a detailed discussion of McMahon's facts.
32 Id at 227 (noting that the party opposing arbitration has the burden to show that "Con-
gress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue").
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While the Supreme Court has not yet applied McMahon to the
MMWA, it has followed this three-part test in a number of other
statutory contexts. In every statutory context it has considered, the
Supreme Court has upheld application of the FAA." Specifically, the
Court has held that the FAA requires enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA")," Sherman Act," Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act, 6 Securities Act of 1933,3, Securities Exchange Act
of 1934," and most recently, the Truth in Lending Act.39 In each of
these cases, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute's text, legis-
lative history, and purpose did not evince congressional intent to ex-
clude the statute from application of the FAA. As detailed below,
however, none of these cases has addressed the issue presented by the
MMWA: how courts should treat agency interpretations of statutes
under McMahon.
C. The Supreme Court's Treatment of Agency Interpretations
under McMahon
The Supreme Court has never decided what role, if any, an
agency's interpretation of a statute should have under the McMahon
test. Perhaps the closest the Court has ever come to this issue was in
McMahon itself, in which the Supreme Court held that the FAA re-
quired enforcement of agreements to arbitrate Securities Exchange
Act claims. ° In reaching this result, the Court refused to consider an
SEC regulation prohibiting arbitration of claims under the Securities
Exchange Act." The Court found, and the SEC agreed," that the regu-
33 See notes 34-39 and accompanying text for cases upholding application of the FAA.
34 See Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 US 20, 35 (1991) (holding that claims
arising under the ADEA are subject to binding arbitration under the FAA).
35 See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 US at 628-40 (holding that antitrust claims arising under the
Sherman Act are arbitrable pursuant to the FAA).
36 See McMahon, 482 US at 242 (holding that agreements to arbitrate civil RICO claims
are enforceable under the FAA).
37 See Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/American Express, Inc, 490 US 477, 484-86 (1989)
(finding that parties must submit claims arising under the Securities Act to arbitration where
they have agreed to do so), overruling Wilko v Swan, 346 US 427 (1953).
38 See McMahon, 482 US at 238 (holding that agreements to arbitrate Securities Ex-
change Act claims are enforceable under the FAA).
39 See Green Tree Financial Corp-Alabama v Randolph, 531 US 79, 88-92 (2000) (uphold-
ing an agreement to arbitrate a Truth in Lending Act claim under the FAA where respondent
did not meet the burden of showing that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive). The
FAA also requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate state law claims. See Circuit City
Stores, Inc v Adams, 121 S Ct 1302, 1311-12 (2001) (upholding agreement to arbitrate claims
under California state tort law and California Fair Employment and Housing Act contained in
plaintiffs employment contract).
40 482 US at 238.
41 Id at 234n3.
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lation was not based on any independent analysis of the Act by the
SEC but on court of appeals decisions.3 For that reason, the Court left
open the question of how such a regulation should be treated under
McMahon if based on an agency's independent interpretation of valid
law.
The Court has also rejected the notion that mere agency in-
volvement in the enforcement of a statute indicates Congress's intent
to preclude arbitration." In Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp,
45
the Court held that ADEA claims are subject to the FAA, despite the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") active role
in enforcing the ADEA."7 The Gilmer Court, however, did not face an
EEOC regulation that prohibited arbitration and that placed the
ADEA in direct conflict with the FAA. Thus, the Supreme Court has
yet to resolve how courts applying the McMahon framework should
treat an agency's independent determination that a statute prohibits
arbitration.
II. APPLYING MCMAHON: COMPETING APPROACHES TO RESOLVING
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FAA AND MMWA
While the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the
MMWA creates an exception to the FAA, several lower federal and
state courts have addressed the issue. 7 Although all of these courts
have generally adhered to the McMahon framework, they remain di-
vided on the result.48 Disagreement about how to treat the FTC regu-
lations prohibiting arbitration when applying McMahon is the pri-
mary reason for this division. 9 This Part first examines the key provi-
sions of the MMWA and the FTC regulations. It then describes com-
peting approaches courts have taken to resolve the tension between
the FAA and MMWA. In particular, it focuses on how these courts
have treated the FTC regulations when applying McMahon.
A. Consumer Protection and the MMWA
In 1974, Congress passed the MMWA in response to a growing
number of consumer complaints regarding the inadequacy of warran-
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 US 20,28-29 (1991) (rejecting the mere in-
volvement of an agency in enforcing a statute as sufficient to preclude arbitration).
45 500 US 20 (1991).
46 Id at 28.
47 See note 13.
48 For a discussion of the disagreement between courts, see Part II.C.
49 See Part II.C.
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ties on consumer goods.' The MMWA has three main purposes: "to
improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent
deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer
products."51 The MMWA is based on the premise that better-informed
consumers will fuel a more competitive market for warranties, which
will yield more generous warranties overall."
The MMWA employs a number of safeguards to advance these
goals. First, the MMWA establishes minimum standards that warran-
tors must meet to feature a "full" warranty on a consumer product.53
Although the MMWA applies only to written warranties, 8 and in fact
does not require a manufacturer to offer a warranty at all, it nonethe-
less significantly limits a manufacturer's ability to disclaim implied
warranties. " In addition, the MMWA creates a federal cause of action
for violation of the statute, stating that a consumer "may bring suit for
damages and other legal and equitable relief" in any appropriate
court. 6
Finally, the MMWA allows a manufacturer to incorporate "in-
formal dispute settlement procedures" into a written warranty as long
as the procedures comply with minimum standards prescribed by the
FTC. If the manufacturer meets these requirements, the consumer
must resort to the mechanism before she may bring a civil action."
The MMWA does not, however, define what constitutes an "informal
dispute settlement procedure," nor does it state that these informal
procedures are the only forms of dispute resolution allowed under the
statute. Rather, it provides only that such procedure is a precursor,
not a bar, to litigation.' Thus, the MMWA delegates to the FTC the
authority to prescribe rules governing any procedure that falls within
50 See Mace E. Gunter, Can Warrantors Make an End Run? The Magnuson-Moss Act and
Mandatory Arbitration in Written Warranties, 34 Ga L Rev 1483,1487-89 (2000) (discussing the
general history of the MMWA).
51 15 USC § 2302(a) (1994).
52 See Curtis R. Reitz, Consumer Product Warranties under Federal and State Laws 19-20
(ALl 2d ed 1987) (discussing the original purposes of the MMWA).
53 See 15 USC § 2303(a) (noting that a warranty must meet the provisions of 15 USC
§ 2304 to be considered a full warranty).
54 See Gunter, 34 Ga L Rev at 1491-92 (cited in note 50) (noting that Congress limited
written warranties in order to stop sellers from drawing in consumers with a false sense of secu-
rity in deceptive written warranties).
55 See 15 USC § 2308(a) (listing situations when a supplier may not disclaim or modify
implied warranties).
56 15 USC § 2310(d) (but placing limited restrictions, including minimum amount in con-
troversy and class size).
57 15 USC § 2310(a)(2).
58 15 USC § 2310(a)(3) (noting a "consumer may not commence a civil action ... unless he
initially resorts to such procedures").
59 Id.
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the ambit of an "informal dispute settlement procedure" but does not
define where those boundaries lie.
B. FTC Regulations Prohibit Arbitration of MMWA Claims
The FTC has promulgated several regulations establishing the
requirements that "informal dispute settlement procedures" must
meet in order to be valid under the MMWA. The FTC has adopted
regulations stating that binding arbitration is not an "informal dispute
settlement procedure," and, therefore, is disallowed under the
MMWA.6° Specifically, the regulations provide that the "[diecisions of
the [informal procedure] shall not be legally binding on any person.'
The FTC explains that this regulation prohibits warrantors from "re-
quir[ing] consumers to resort to [informal procedures] whose deci-
sions would be legally binding (e.g., binding arbitration)."62
The FTC goes beyond banning arbitration as part of any "infor-
mal dispute settlement procedures," however. The regulations also
embody the agency's determination that the MMWA as a whole pro-
hibits binding arbitration, stating that "reference within the written
warranty to any binding, non-judicial remedy is prohibited by the
Rule and the [Magnuson-Moss Warranty] Act.'' In this way, the FTC
presumes that informal procedures are the only ones the MMWA
permits. Thus, the FTC reasons that because the MMWA allows only
informal procedures, and because arbitration is not such a procedure,
the MMWA bans binding arbitration entirely.
C. Competing Approaches to Resolving the FAA-MMWA Conflict
The lower federal and state courts that have considered the ten-
sion between the FAA and MMWA are divided on the result. The
courts disagree about how to treat the FTC regulations prohibiting
binding arbitration under the McMahon test. Some courts, when ap-
plying McMahon, consider the FTC regulations as evidence of Con-
gress's intent and conclude that agreements to arbitrate MMWA
claims are unenforceable. These courts follow two main approaches
when dealing with the regulations under McMahon. Some consider
the regulations in addition to the three factors laid out in McMahon:
the statute's text, legislative history, and purpose. 6 Others consider
60 See 16 CFR § 703.50); 40 Fed Reg at 60211 (cited in note 12).
61 See 16 CFR § 703.50) (emphasis added).
62 40 Fed Reg at 60211 (cited in note 12).
63 Id (emphasis added).
64 See note 13.
65 See, for example, Pitchford v Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc, 124 F Supp 2d 958, 963-65
(W D Va 2000); Wilson v Waverlee Homes, Inc, 954 F Supp 1530,1538-39 (M D Ala 1997).
66 See, for example, Wilson, 954 F Supp at 1537-39 (basing its decision that the MMWA is
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only the regulations. In Wilson v Waverlee Homes,6 for example, the
district court followed the first approach and looked to the MMWA's
text, legislative history, and purposes, in addition to the FTC regula-
tions, as evidence of Congress's intent to bar arbitration. Therefore,
the FTC regulations provided strong support for the court's conclu-
sion that Congress intended to preclude binding arbitration of
MMWA claims.
On the other hand, in Pitchford v Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc, °
the district court followed the second approach and considered the
FTC regulations alone as sufficient evidence of Congress's intent to
prohibit arbitration under McMahon." Thus, the court did not exam-
ine the MMWA's text, legislative history, or purposes to determine
congressional intent." In this case, the FFC regulations clearly deter-
mined the outcome of the McMahon inquiry. Under either of these
two approaches, a court's decision to rely on the regulations as evi-
dence of Congress's intent invariably leads to the decision that the
MMWA prohibits arbitration.7
Other courts refuse entirely to consider the FTC regulations un-
der McMahon and uphold the arbitrability of MMWA claims. For ex-
ample, in Southern Energy Homes, Inc v Ard," the court applied
McMahon and found that the MMWA's text, legislative history, and
purposes were consistent with permitting arbitration." The court
adopted the reasoning of the dissent in Southern. Energy Homes v
76Lee, which refused to consider the FIC regulations, concluding that
the Supreme Court has specifically rejected the agency's reasoning
behind its prohibition." Because the court rejected the regulations as
exempt from the FAA on the FTC regulations in addition to the MMWA's text, legislative his-
tory, and purposes).
67 See, for example, Pitchford, 124 F Supp 2d at 663-65 (finding that the MMWA's prohibi-
tion of arbitration and the MMWA's intent discernible from the FTC regulations themselves).
68 954 F Supp 2d 1530 (M D Ala 1997).
69 Idat 1537-39.
70 124 F Supp 2d 958 (W D Va 2000).
71 Id at 963-65.
72 See id.
73 Interestingly, some of these courts specifically rely on Southern Energy Homes, Inc v
Lee, 732 S2d 994 (Ala 1999), an Alabama Supreme Court case that was overruled by that court
just one year later in Southern Energy Homes, Inc v Ard, 772 S2d 1131 (Ala 2000).
74 772 S2d 1131 (Ala 2000).
75 Id at 1135 (overruling Lee and adopting the reasoning of Justice See's dissent in that
case, id at 1008-13).
76 732 S2d 994, 1008-13 (Ala 1999) (See dissenting).
77 See id at 1010-12. Specifically, Justice See found that the FrC's regulations were based
on "mistrust" of arbitration that had explicitly been rejected by the Supreme Court in Gilmer,
500 US at 30 (stating that "[sluch generalized attacks on arbitration 'rest on suspicion of arbitra-
tion ... [and are] far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes fa-
voring this method of resolving disputes"'), quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/American
Express, Inc, 490 US 477,481 (1989).
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based on faulty reasoning, it did not reach the question whether such
agency regulations, if otherwise valid interpretations of the MMWA,
should be included in the McMahon inquiry."8
III. COURTS SHOULD NOT CONSIDER F'C REGULATIONS
PROHIBITING ARBITRATION AS EVIDENCE OF
CONGRESS'S INTENT UNDER MCMAHON
When applying McMahon, courts should not consider the FTC's
prohibition of binding arbitration as evidence of Congress's intent to
exclude MMWA claims from the purview of the FAA because the
MMWA cannot reasonably be understood to give the FTC the power
to override the FAA. That is, assuming that Congress could delegate
to an administrative agency the power to decide whether a statute will
be exempt from the FAA, Congress did not do so in the MMWA. This
Comment proposes that when agency interpretation of a statute
places that statute in direct conflict with the FAA, courts should con-
sider the interpretation under McMahon only if the agency is acting
pursuant to a specific delegation from Congress.
As discussed earlier, courts are divided on how to treat the Fl'C
regulations when applying McMahon."9 Because nothing in the
MMWA's text, legislative history, or purposes precludes arbitration, a
court's decision of whether to consider the regulations effectively de-
termines the conclusion the court will reach.'o Therefore, development
of a consistent theory regarding treatment of agency regulations un-
der McMahon would help achieve uniformity among courts facing
this issue.
Part III.A discusses why courts should not interpret the MMWA
as delegating to the FTC the decision to prohibit arbitration of
MMWA claims. It argues that the FTC's total prohibition of arbitra-
tion is contrary to clear congressional intent expressed in the FAA
and is not entitled to judicial deference under Chevron USA Inc v
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.8' Specifically, the MMWA's
text, legislative history, and purposes neither expressly nor implicitly
delegate to the FTC the power to override the FAA. As a result, the
regulations are unlawful insofar as they bar arbitration of MMWA
claims and should be vacated. Finally, this Part advocates interpreting
the MMWA according to the presumptions favoring arbitration and
78 See Ard, 772 S2d at 1135 (failing to address the issue of an agency's valid interpreta-
tion); Lee, 732 S2d at 1008-13 (See dissenting) (same).
79 See note 13.
80 See Part II.C.
81 467 US 837, 842-43 (1984) (noting that "[iuf the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress").
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consistency in the law. Such an interpretation resolves interpretive
doubts in favor of arbitration and nondelegation.
Part III.B examines the policy implications of excluding the FTC
regulations, and other agency interpretations that conflict with the
FAA, from the McMahon test absent a clear congressional delegation.
This Part argues that requiring greater specificity from Congress
when deciding to depart from the FAA yields several advantages, in-
cluding the reduction of decision and error costs and increased politi-
cal accountability. Finally, this Part rejects the arguments that this ap-
proach is unworkable and undermines the expertise of the FTC.
A. The MMWA Does Not Grant the FTC the Power to Prohibit
Binding Arbitration
Courts should not consider the FTC regulations as evidence of
Congress's intent under McMahon because the MMWA cannot rea-
sonably be read to delegate to the FTC the authority to prohibit arbi-
tration. First, the FTC's ban on arbitration is not entitled to judicial
deference under Chevron because it is contrary to the congressional
intent, expressed in the FAA, to uphold arbitration.8' Second, the
MMWA does not change this result. Because the regulations directly
conflict with the FAA, they can be consistent with congressional in-
tent only if the MMWA creates an exception to the FAA. Both the
MMWA itself and its interpretation according to presumptions favor-
ing arbitration and continuity in the law demonstrate, however, that
the MMWA does not create such an exception.
1. The conflict between the FAA's pro-arbitration presumption
and the FTC's regulations.
An agency interpretation of a statute is entitled to judicial defer-
ence under Chevron if two conditions are met: (1) Congress has not
directly spoken on the issue, and (2) the agency's interpretation is rea-
sonable." In other words, the first prong of Chevron requires the
court, as "the final authority on issues of statutory construction," to
reject an agency regulation that is "contrary to clear congressional in-
tent." To determine whether an interpretation is contrary to congres-
sional intent, a court may look beyond the face of the particular stat-
ute at hand." A court can consider the statute's context and other
82 Id (noting that if congressional intent is clear, the court and agency must give effect to
that intent).
83 Id at 842-44.
84 Id at 843 n9.
85 See FDA v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 US 120, 132 (2000) (stating that
"[i]n determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the question at issue, a reviewing
court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation"); MCI
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statutes as well.' According to Justice Scalia, the more "that the
meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship
with other laws," the less likely it is "that the triggering requirement
for Chevron deference exists."' When applying Chevron to the FTC
regulations promulgated pursuant to the MMWA, a court may there-
fore consider whether the regulations are contrary to congressional
intent expressed in the FAA.
By enacting the FAA, Congress clearly stated that all arbitration
agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," language
that is unequivocal and allows exceptions only when Congress itself
creates them. The FTC's regulations, meanwhile, prohibit arbitration
in direct conflict with this command. Thus, unless the MMWA mani-
fests a clear congressional desire to deviate from the FAA, the FIC
regulations are contrary to the congressional intent expressed in the
FAA and fail the first prong of Chevron." As the following three sec-
tions demonstrate,, an interpretation of the MMWA in accordance
with the presumptions in favor of arbitration and continuity in the law
permits no room for regulations prohibiting arbitration.
2. The MMWA's text, legislative history, and purposes.
To find that the regulations are not contrary to congressional in-
tent as expressed in the FAA, the MMWA must somehow authorize
the agency to prohibit arbitration and override the FAA's mandate.
Under Chevron, courts may "employ[] traditional tools of statutory
construction" to determine whether such an authorization exists.,0 A
statute's text, legislative history, and purposes are three such funda-
mental tools of construction. 1 Because nothing in the MMWA's text,
Telecommunications Corp v American Telephone & Telegraph Co, 512 US 218, 226 (1994) (look-
ing to "contextual indications" to determine whether agency interpretation is entitled to defer-
ence under Chevron).
86 See Brown v Gardner, 513 US 115, 118 (1994) (declaring an agency's interpretation of
the word "injury" incorrect after examining the context of the language and similar language in
other statutes); Brown & Williamson, 529 US at 133 (stating that "the meaning of one statute
may be affected by other Acts").
87 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke
L J 511,521.
88 9USC§ 2.
89 See Chevron, 467 US at 842-43 (noting the first prong focuses on the clarity of congres-
sional intent). See, for example, McMahon, 482 US at 226-27 (stating that "[t]he [Federal] Arbi-
tration Act, standing alone, therefore mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statu-
tory claims").
90 467 US at 843 n 9.
91 See, for example, Estate of Cowart v Nicklos Drilling Co, 505 US 469, 476, 482 (1992)
(relying on the plain meaning and purposes of Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act § 33 in rejecting the agency's definition of "person entitled to compensation" under the
Act); Dole v United Steelworkers of America, 494 US 26, 35-43 (1990) (holding that the text,
structure, legislative history, and purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act overrode the Office
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legislative history, or purposes can be understood to authorize the
FTC to override the FAA by banning arbitration, the FTC regulations
are not entitled to judicial deference under Chevron, are invalid, and
should be excluded from the McMahon inquiry.2
a) Text. The MMWA's text contains neither an express nor an
implied delegation to the FTC to ban arbitration. Textual sources are
the focal point of statutory interpretation,9 in which courts consider
the statute's "plain meaning,"" its structure as a whole, the similarity
of language used elsewhere in the statute, the rules of grammar and
syntax, and the statute's relationship with other laws. Under this ap-
proach, statutory text should be dispositive in the absence of other
sources to the contrary.
95
The text of the MMWA does not authorize the FTC to ban arbi-
tration because (1) arbitration is not an "informal dispute resolution
procedure" over which the FTC rightfully has discretion, and (2) the
FTC does not have the authority to declare informal procedures the
only ones allowed by the MMWA. First, the MMWA allows warran-
tors to establish informal dispute resolution procedures that a con-
sumer must exhaust before filing a claim in court,9 and it grants the
FTC the power to establish rules governing those procedures. The
FTC's authority, however, encompasses only "informal dispute set-
tlement procedures,"" and thus it is necessary to define that term to
understand the limits of the congressional delegation. Although the
MMWA does not define "informal dispute settlement procedures," it
of Management and Budget's interpretation of the Act).
92 Text, legislative history, and purposes are used here to show that there is no delegation
entitled to judicial deference under Chevron. While the Chevron and McMahon schemes of
statutory interpretation utilize the same tools of construction in this analysis, they are different
in key respects. Most importantly, under McMahon, ambiguity is resolved in favor of arbitration.
Under Chevron, however, ambiguity is decided in favor of the agency, and in this case, against
arbitration. See Part III.B.1 for further discussion of this point.
93 See Estate of Cowart, 505 US at 475 (Kennedy) (stating that "[in a statutory construc-
tion case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks
with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordi-
nary circumstance, is finished").
94 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 Mich L Rev 1509,1512
(1998) (defining "plain meaning" of a statute as the interpretation that an ordinary reader
would give to the statutory language).
95 For example, in Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill, 437 US 153, 184 n 29, 193-94 (1978),
modified by 16 USC § 1536(h) (1994) (allowing projects injuring endangered species under lim-
ited circumstances), the Court held that the plain meaning of the Endangered Species Act pro-
hibited completion of the Tellico Dam. Chief Justice Burger noted that "[w]hen confronted with
a statute which is plain and unambiguous on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative his-
tory as a guide to its meaning." Id at 184 n 29. See also Estate of Cowart, 505 US at 476 (stating
that "[t]he controlling principle in this case is the basic and unexceptional rule that courts must
give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written").
96 15 USC § 2310(a)(3).
97 Id § 2310(a)(2).
98 Id.
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does state that any such procedure must be exhausted before a con-
sumer files a claim in court." Courts universally apply a "whole act
rule" when interpreting statutory text, recognizing that "[a] word or
clause that is ambiguous at first glance might be clarified if 'the same
terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning
clear.""00
In contrast, binding arbitration is generally understood to be a
substitute for a judicial forum, not a prerequisite to it.'0' Webster's New
International Dictionary defines arbitration as "the hearing and de-
termination of a cause between parties in controversy by a person or
persons chosen by the parties, or appointed under statutory authority,
instead of by a judicial tribunal provided by law.' ' n
Thus, binding arbitration is not an "informal dispute settlement
procedure" within the meaning of the MMWA, but rather a formal,
final adjudication that takes the place of the judicial decisionmaking
process.'3 Understanding "informal dispute settlement procedures" to
exclude binding arbitration makes sense of this provision. Taken as a
whole, then, the MMWA's use of the phrase "informal dispute settle-
ment procedures" does not encompass binding arbitration. As a re-
sult, the agency's power to make rules regarding these informal pro-
cedures does not include the ability to ban binding arbitration com-
pletely.
Finally, the MMWA's provision for "informal dispute settlement
procedures" does not imply the prohibition of other formal dispute
resolution procedures, such as arbitration."' In Gilmer, the Supreme
Court held that the ADEA's allowance for "informal methods of con-
ciliation, conference, and persuasion" did not preclude arbitration of
ADEA claims."' Rather, the Court found that the ADEA's provision
99 Id § 2310(a)(3).
100 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip . Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Statu-
tory Interpretation 263-65 (Foundation 2000), quoting United Savings Association of Texas v
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Inc, 484 US 365,371 (1988).
101 See Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language 138 (Merriam 2d
ed 1956). See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 US 614, 628
(1985) (stating that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the sub-
stantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
than a judicial, forum").
102 Webster's New International Dictionary at 138 (cited in note 101) (emphasis added).
103 See Tom Arnold, A Vocabulary of ADR Procedures, in Arbitration, Mediation, and
Other ADR Methods 11, 33 (ALI 1993) (defining "binding arbitration," in relevant part, as a
"fairly formal case presentation as in a court trial though as often held in a conference room or
the like as in a borrowed courtroom").
104 See, for example, Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpreta-
tion at 255-56 (cited in note 100) (discussing inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, or "the inclusion
... of one thing suggests the exclusion of all others" as an unreliable canon of statutory interpre-
tation).
105 500 US at 29, quoting 29 USC § 626(b) (1988).
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for these dispute resolution mechanisms evinced Congress's "flexible
approach to resolution of [ADEA] claims."'' Arbitration, the court
held, is consistent with this flexible statutory scheme. On this account,
the MMWA's express provision for "informal dispute settlement pro-
cedures" does not imply the prohibition of other dispute resolution
procedures. Because the MMWA's language providing for "informal
dispute settlement procedures" neither includes nor prohibits binding
arbitration, the F-C acted outside of its jurisdiction when it banned
arbitration under the MMWA entirely.
b) Legislative history. The MMWA's legislative history confirms
that Congress did not authorize the FTC to exempt the statute from
the purview of the FAA. The House of Representatives Report states
that "[a]n adverse decision in any informal dispute settlement pro-
ceeding would not be a bar to a civil action on the warranty involved
in the proceeding."'' 7 This language supports the textual reading that
the FTC can make any rule with respect to "informal dispute settle-
ment procedures," including the preservation of a judicial forum. Be-
cause binding arbitration is not an "informal dispute settlement pro-
cedure," however, this history does not authorize the FTC to prohibit
arbitration completely.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has rejected much more per-
suasive legislative history as evidence of Congress's intent to create
an exception to the FAA. In McMahon, the Court concluded that the
legislative history of a 1975 amendment to the Securities Exchange
Act did not indicate Congress's desire to prohibit arbitration "O In that
case, the Conference Report explicitly adopted the Supreme Court's
then-valid decision in Wilko v Swan,'O' prohibiting arbitration of Secu-
rities Act claims. ' The Supreme Court later overruled Wilko and up-
held agreements to arbitrate Securities Act claims." Despite the ex-
plicit adoption of the Wilko rule against arbitration, the McMahon
Court concluded that the report's language was not clear enough to
create an exception to the FAA."2 Instead, the Court stated that it
could not see how Congress intended to bar arbitration under the Ex-
106 Gilmer, 500 US at 29.
107 Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, HR Rep No
93-1107, 93d Cong, 2d Sess 41 (1974), reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 7702,7723.
108 482 US at 236-37.
109 346 US 427 (1953).
110 The Conference Report for the amendment to the Securities Exchange Act states, "It
was the clear understanding of the conferees that this amendment did not change existing law,
as articulated in Wilko v. Swan . .. concerning the effect of arbitration proceedings provisions."
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, HR Rep No 94-229, 94th Cong, 1st Sess 111 (1975), re-
printed in 1975 USCCAN 321,342, quoted in McMahon, 482 US at 236-37.
ItI Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/American Express, Inc, 490 US 477,485 (1989), overrul-
ing Wilko.
112 McMahon, 482 US at 237-38.
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change Act "without enacting into law any provision remotely ad-
dressing that subject."' 3
In contrast, the MMWA's legislative history makes no explicit
mention of arbitration. It refers only generally to conditions of "in-
formal dispute settlement procedures."" Surely if Congress's specific
endorsement of an existing ban on arbitration is insufficient to ex-
empt the Securities Exchange Act from application of the FAA, so
too is the vague language contained in the MMWA's history. The
MMWA's legislative history, then, supports the textual reading that
Congress did not intend to grant the FTC the power to bar binding
arbitration.
c) Purposes. Likewise, the purposes of the MMWA do not imply
that Congress authorized the FTC to ban arbitration. The MMWA
aims to "improve the adequacy of information available to consumers,
prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of con-
sumer products."''. These consumer protection goals are fully consis-
tent with arbitration. In Green Tree Financial Corp-Alabama v
Randolph,"6 the Court upheld the arbitrability of claims arising under
the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), a consumer protection statute
similar to the MMWA."7 The Court did not suggest that any aspect of
TILA's objective of protecting and informing consumers indicated a
congressional desire to deviate from the FAA."8 Rather, the Supreme
Court stressed that "even claims arising under a statute designed to
further important social policies may be arbitrated. '"9 The Court has
repeatedly adhered to this rationale and upheld arbitration in a num-
ber of other areas of great social importance, including the enforce-
ment of age discrimination,"' antitrust, ' and securities laws.""
Nevertheless, the FTC asserts that arbitration conflicts with the
MMWA's goals for two main reasons: (1) arbitration procedures are
insufficient to protect consumers armed with unequal bargaining
power; and (2) binding arbitration conflicts with the MMWA's provi-
sion for a judicial forum.'" The Supreme Court has resoundingly re-
113 Id at 237.
114 HR Rep No 93-1107 at 40-41, reprinted in 1974 USCCAN at 7723 (cited in note 107).
115 15 USC § 2302(a).
116 531 US 79 (2000).
117 Id at 88-92.
118 Id.
119 Id at 90.
120 See Gilmer, 500 US at 27-28 (upholding arbitration of ADEA claim).
121 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 US 614, 626, 628 (1985)
(upholding arbitration of Sherman Act claim).
122 See McMahon, 482 US at 232, 238 (upholding arbitration of Securities Exchange Act
claim); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 US at 483 (same).
123 See 40 Fed Reg at 60210 (cited in note 12) (stating that the FTC has prohibited binding
arbitration of MMWA claims because the agency "is not now convinced that any guidelines
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jected both of these premises. First, in Gilmer, the Supreme Court
held that inequality in bargaining power between an employer and his
employee was insufficient to create a conflict between the ADEA and
the FAA.4 The Court emphasized that attacks on the adequacy of ar-
bitration "'rest on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening
the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complain-
ants,' and as such, they are 'far out of step with our current strong en-
dorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving
disputes."" 5
Second, the FTC's contention that arbitration conflicts with the
MMWA's provision of a judicial forum is at odds with well-
established Supreme Court jurisprudence. In almost every FAA case
that the Supreme Court has decided, the statute allegedly in conflict
with the FAA contained a similar provision."' Nonetheless, every
time, the Supreme Court held that the general provision of a judicial
forum was insufficient to imply an intention to preclude arbitration.
In sum, the FTC's rationale behind its regulations is without merit
and cannot, under current FAA jurisprudence, sanction its decision to
ban arbitration.
The FTC regulations are therefore not entitled to judicial defer-
ence under Chevron because they are contrary to the clear congres-
sional intent expressed in the FAA favoring arbitration. The
MMWA's text, legislative history, and purposes neither expressly nor
implicitly authorize the FFC to contravene the FAA's mandate and
bar arbitration of MMWA claims. As the next two sections demon-
strate, interpretation of the MMWA according to canons favoring ar-
bitration and continuity in the law only reinforce this result.
3. The FAA's strong presumption in favor of arbitration.
Under Chevron, courts may "employ[] traditional tools of statu-
tory construction" to determine whether Congress has spoken on a
which it set out could ensure sufficient protection for consumers"); 16 CFR § 700.8 (stating that
binding arbitration clauses "are deceptive since section 110(d) of the [MMWA] gives state and
federal courts jurisdiction over suits for breach of warranty and service contract").
124 500 US at 32 (stating that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power [ ] is not a sufficient
reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context").
125 Id at 30, quoting Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 US at 481. See also Green Tree Financial, 531
US at 89-90 (recognizing the Court's rejection of "generalized attacks on arbitration" that stem
from suspicion of the substantive fairness of arbitration).
126 See, for example, Gilmer, 500 US at 29 (holding that ADEA claims are arbitrable even
though Congress grants state and federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over these claims); Rod-
riguez de Quijas, 490 US at 482-83 (stating that agreements to arbitrate Securities Act claims
are valid notwithstanding the Act's provision of a judicial forum for relief); McMahon, 482 US
at 229 (noting that the Security Exchange Act's grant of jurisdiction to federal district courts did
not imply a congressional desire to deviate from the FAA when arbitration is adequate to pro-
tect the substantive rights in issue).
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particular issue. '27 Many canons of interpretation are designed to pre-
serve well-established federal policies in the absence of a clear state-
ment from Congress to the contrary.'2 As an example, Professor Cass
Sunstein notes:
[Tihere is a general federal policy against anticompetitive prac-
tices, and agencies will not be permitted to seize on ambiguous
statutory language so as to defeat that policy. If Congress wants
to make an exception to the policy in favor of competition, it is
certainly permitted to do so. But agencies may not do so without
congressional instruction.
1 29
Sunstein notes that courts employ similar canons of interpreta-
tion to force congressional decisionmaking in other areas, such as
taxation and Native American affairs. °
The FAA enjoys a similar interpretive presumption as a pro-
arbitration canon, favoring its application except where specifically
exempted. The Supreme Court has stated that the FAA creates a sub-
stantive presumption favoring arbitration, which courts must apply
when determining whether another statute conflicts with the 
FAA.13 1
Similarly, Professors William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P Frickey, and
Elizabeth Garrett specifically recognize the "[r]ule favoring arbitra-
tion of federal statutory claims" as a statute-based canon of construc-
tion used by the Rehnquist Court."
Thus, the MMWA must be interpreted with the strong presump-
tion favoring arbitration embodied in the FAA in mind.' Congress
enacted the MMWA against the backdrop of the FAA and a long his-
tory of enforcement of arbitration agreements.' Yet, the MMWA
127 467 US at 843 n 9.
128 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U Chi L Rev 315, 334 (2000) (describing
nondelegation canons that are "designed to implement perceived public policy, by, among other
things, giving sense and rationality the benefit of the doubt and by requiring Congress itself to
speak if it wants to compromise policy that is perceived as generally held").
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corp, 460 US 1, 24-25
(1983):
The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem
at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay,
or a like defense to arbitrability.
132 Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation at 382 (cited in
note 100).
133 See id (recognizing the rule in favor of arbitration of federal statutory claims as a canon
of construction used to interpret federal statutes).
134 See McLaughlin, 59 Albany L Rev at 907 (cited in note 22) (stating that "[t]he Court's
decisions [over the last twenty years] represent a strong endorsement for arbitration as an alter-
native form of dispute resolution").
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provides only that the FTC shall establish rules regarding "informal
dispute settlement procedures.' '35 It makes no mention of arbitration.
It is unlikely that Congress would have delegated authority to the
FTC without more specific language. Therefore, the MMWA's lan-
guage is insufficient to overcome the FAA's general mandate favoring
arbitration. Thus, the FAA trumps the FTC regulations.
Significantly, this approach does not preclude Congress from
ever delegating the decision to prohibit arbitration completely in the
MMWA or any other statute. ' It merely requires Congress to provide
a clear statement of its intention to delegate this decision. For exam-
ple, if Congress provided that "the FTC shall decide whether the FAA
will apply to claims under the MMWA," or a like statement, the dele-
gation to the agency would be clear, and therefore, effective. The
FTC's decision regarding the arbitrability of MMWA claims would
then flow from a congressional delegation specific enough to over-
come the FAA and would be relevant under McMahon.
4. The presumption in favor of statutory continuity
and harmony.
Congress does not enact statutes on a blank slate. ' Rather, every
law is a part of an elaborate legal system. Interpreting statutes, where
possible, to be consistent with other statutes encourages harmony and
coherence in this scheme.7 This approach to statutory interpretation
also promotes predictability and stability in the law.131 In this way, it
resembles the practice of relying on common law principles to fill
gaps left by statutes.'0 Allowing statutes, as well as judge-made law, to
fill these gaps is a natural extension of the common law approach.
135 15 USC § 2310(a)(2).
136 See Sunstein, 67 U Chi L Rev at 336 (cited in note 128) ("[T]he nondelegation canons
are merely tools of construction, and []they should not be taken to forbid Congress from dele-
gating expressly if it chooses.").
137 See Norman J. Singer, 2B Statutes and Statutory Construction § 53.01 at 229-30 (Clark
Boardman Callaghan 5th ed 1992) ("Legislation never is written on a clean slate, nor is it ever
read in isolation or applied in a vacuum.").
138 See id (stating that harmony and consistency are positive values in statutory interpreta-
tion because they reduce arbitrariness and encourage impartiality); Ronald Dworkin, Law's
Empire 227 (Belknap 1986) (arguing that integrity in law requires horizontal consistency in cur-
rent legal principles).
139 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 239 (Harvard 1994) (ar-
guing that a liberal theory of statutory interpretation-which considers the original intent of the
statute, prior precedents interpreting the statute, and traditional norms-preserves predictabil-
ity and stability in the law).
140 For a general discussion of the common law approach, see Singer, 2B Statutes and Statu-
tory Construction § 50 at 89-115 (cited in note 137) (noting how antecedent common law on the
statute's subject may help guide the interpretation).
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Under this approach, Congress is assumed not to create discontinui-
ties in the law without some clear statement to that effect.'
41
In light of these principles, the MMWA is best interpreted consis-
tently, rather than in conflict, with the FAA. To promote coherence in
the law with respect to arbitration, courts should uphold the FAA ex-
cept where Congress has clearly stated otherwise. As discussed above,
the MMWA's phrase "informal dispute settlement procedure" can be
read to exclude binding arbitration from the list of remedies over
which the FrC has statutory authority.14 2 Interpreting the MMWA in
this way avoids conflict with the FAA and ensures a coherent federal
scheme consistent with the FAA's strong presumption favoring arbi-
tration. ' In addition, this approach recognizes Congress's inability to
legislate on every detail, filling the gaps left in the MMWA with the
background rule Congress clearly provided in the FAA.
B. Advantages of Requiring Greater Specificity from Congress
When Delegating the Power to Deviate from the FAA
Excluding the FTC regulations from the McMahon inquiry forces
Congress to be more specific when delegating to an agency the power
to create an exception to the FAA. Several advantages result, such as
the reduction in decision and error costs for both courts and Con-
gress'" as well as increased political accountability and deliberation
regarding the decision to deviate from the FAA. ' Furthermore, re-
quiring Congress to be explicit when delegating the decision to bar
arbitration is a workable solution and does not prevent reaping the
benefits of an administrative agency's expertise.'
1. Reduced decision costs for Congress and courts.
For Congress, the FAA represents a valuable default rule. That is,
unless Congress specifies otherwise, the FAA requires enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.' In this way, the FAA de-
cides any statutory gaps left by Congress in the way that Congress
would most often decide them-in favor of arbitration. '48As a result,
141 See Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation at 377 (cited
in note 100) (describing the rule of continuity, or the assumption "that Congress does not create
discontinuities in legal rights and obligations without some clear statement").
142 See Part III.A.2.a.
143 See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corp, 460 US 1, 24-25
(1983) (noting the presumption in favor of arbitration).
144 See Parts III.B.1 and III.B.2.
145 See Part III.B.3.
146 See Part III.B.4.
147 See McMahon, 482 US at 226-27.
148 See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corp, 460 US 1, 24-25
(1983) (noting that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
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the FAA minimizes decision costs for both Congress and courts by
enforcing the most frequently desired result whenever a particular
statute is silent.'
4 9
If courts consider the FTC regulations as evidence of Congress's
intent in the absence of a more specific delegation, they undermine
the value of the FAA as a default rule. If courts allow agencies to cir-
cumvent the FAA so easily, Congress is likely to determine that the
only way to curb administrative discretion is for Congress to refuse to
delegate decisionmaking wherever the issue of arbitration may arise.
As a result, Congress will have to enact more detailed legislation
every time it wants to ensure that agencies cannot evade the FAA. In
other words, if courts consider the FTC regulations under McMahon,
Congress will be required to specify each time it makes an agency
delegation whether the FAA does and does not apply to a particular
statute, as opposed to only when it does not apply. 0
Congress enacted the FAA to express a strong policy favoring
arbitration."' As a result, for any given statute, it is much more likely
than not that Congress intended the FAA to apply. Because the num-
ber of cases in which Congress intends to prohibit arbitration are
much fewer than those in which it does not,' a rule that requires
Congress to specify only where it does not intend arbitration to apply
greatly reduces decision costs." ' Of course, Congress could enact a
specific rule reinstating arbitration if, and when, agencies get it wrong.
Note that this choice between courts and Congress as correctors of
agency misinterpretation is not as simple as it appears. First, requiring
Congress to reinstate arbitration when mistakes are made misses the
point of having a default rule in the first place. Second, if agencies
know that they must act pursuant to a clear congressional delegation
to deviate from the FAA, agencies will be less likely to do so. As a re-
sult, Congress will be required to correct agency misrepresentations
less frequently.
favor of arbitration").
149 Decision costs are "the costs of finding out what the law is-a cost faced by courts, Con-
gress, or agencies." Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U Chi L
Rev 636,647 (1999).
150 See Sidney A. Shapiro and Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 Duke L J 819, 871 (arguing that if courts do not
review agency interpretations adequately, Congress "may conclude that the only way to limit
agency discretion is to abandon the discretionary model of delegated power").
151 See Moses H. Cone, 460 US at 24 (noting that the FAA "is a congressional declaration
of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements").
152 Consider id.
153 Moreover, if agencies know that they may only act pursuant to a clear congressional
delegation to deviate from the FAA, agencies too will reduce their decision costs because they
will not have to waste resources in trying to determine whether the FAA applies.
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In addition, exclusion of the FTC regulations from McMahon re-
duces decision costs for courts. Specifically, exclusion of the regula-
tions allows judges to avoid conducting a laborious Chevron test
every time they evaluate an agency regulation that conflicts with the
FAA." When reviewing an agency interpretation under Chevron,
courts must determine whether the interpretation is contrary to con-
gressional intent and is reasonable.' Courts may employ traditional
canons of construction to reach these conclusions, but the process is
necessarily arduous. '
Furthermore, consideration of agency regulations under McMa-
hon absent a clear congressional delegation creates an unwieldy two-
step inquiry that is exacerbated by the tension between McMahon
and Chevron. When a court faces the conflict between the FAA and
another statute, the court must determine whether there is congres-
sional intent to exclude a statute from the FAA under McMahon.
When an agency interpretation prohibiting arbitration is injected into
the analysis, however, the court must also determine, under Chevron,
whether there was congressional intent to uphold application of the
FAA. Under Chevron, ambiguity is resolved in favor of the agency
(which in this case would be in opposition to arbitration), while under
McMahon, ambiguity is resolved in favor of arbitration. Injecting
Chevron into the mix therefore conflicts with McMahon by shifting
the presumption from pro-arbitration to anti-arbitration. Requiring
Congress to make an explicit delegation prevents ambiguity under
Chevron, simplifies the Chevron analysis, and avoids conflict with
McMahon's pro-arbitration assumption.
The situation can be avoided entirely by requiring Congress to
state with specificity when it chooses to depart from the FAA. Assum-
ing, as discussed above, that Congress will depart from the FAA rela-
tively infrequently, it is far more efficient for Congress to override the
default rule when it so desires than for courts to engage in a laborious
inquiry of interpreting congressional intent from ambiguous language
each time an agency tries to override the FAA." Meanwhile, where an
agency is in fact acting pursuant to a clear delegation from Congress,
the Chevron analysis essentially becomes a formality and imposes lit-
tle cost upon the courts.
8
154 See Part III.A.
155 467 US at 842-43.
156 See Parts III.A.2 and III.A.3.
157 See Sunstein, 67 U Chi L Rev at 338 (cited in note 128) (pointing out that decision costs
are much lower for courts applying nondelegation canons of construction as opposed to consti-
tutional nondelegation principles). According to Sunstein, nondelegation canons involve a judi-
cial decision about subject matter, whereas constitutional nondelegation principles involve
harder questions of degree.
158 See Chevron, 467 US at 865 (noting that "an agency to which Congress has delegated
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2. Reduced error costs."'
The FAA embodies a congressional policy favoring arbitration."'O
Absent a specific delegation from Congress, courts and agencies may
err in deciding whether to allow a prohibition on arbitration. Agen-
cies, for example, may mistakenly believe that Congress empowered
them to exclude a particular statutory claim from arbitration. Courts,
meanwhile, may err in deciding to take the agency's decision to devi-
ate from the FAA as evidence of Congress's intent to do so as well. If
the court or the agency gets it wrong, then the federal policies favor-
ing arbitration and freedom of contract are undermined.
Even if courts and agencies are fairly competent at resolving
these issues, the FAA protects interests significant enough that they
should not be constricted unless Congress has specifically said so.
The FAA and many decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence are tes-
taments to the importance of arbitration. As discussed in the next sec-
tion, Congress is the appropriate institution to resolve issues of such
great importance.
In some cases, these error costs might be insignificant because
Congress could easily correct them by enacting subsequent legisla-
tion. Given the demands on Congress's time and the volume of fed-
eral regulation, however, Congress would probably be unable to de-
tect and correct all mistaken prohibitions on arbitration.'. As one
commentator explains, "the same cumbersome organization and time-
consuming process upon which the framers relied to constrain the leg-
islative branch in itself establishing or amending policy hinders it from
using those devices effectively or extensively to direct the policy mak-
ing of its delegees.' '63 Furthermore, requiring Congress constantly to
correct agency mistakes is inefficient when the FAA, as a default rule,
would prevent these mistakes ex ante.
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments").
159 Error costs are "the cost[s] of erroneous judicial decisions." Richard A. Posner, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law 599-600 (Aspen 5th ed 1998).
160 See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corp, 460 US 1, 24
(1983) (recognizing that the FAA is "a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy fa-
voring arbitration agreements").
161 See Sunstein, 67 U Chi L Rev at 338 (cited in note 128) (noting that "the nondelegation
canons have the salutary function of ensuring that certain important rights and interests will not
be compromised unless Congress has expressly decided to compromise them").
162 Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administra-
tive State, 89 Colum L Rev 452, 509 (1989) (noting that substantive legislation to overturn
agency policy does not often occur because of institutional obstacles).
163 Id.
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3. Increased deliberation and political accountability.
Requiring Congress to provide a specific delegation encourages
political accountability.'" Congress is more democratically account-
able than are administrative agencies, and it should not punt an issue
of this importance to an agency without specifically recognizing what
it is doing."' Heads of administrative agencies are bureaucrats who
are not elected." Nevertheless, some commentators consider agencies
almost as politically accountable as Congress because the public can
blame elected officials for agency action.' ' Under this view, the legis-
lative and executive branches must exercise control over agencies for
them to be seen as "political" entities responsive to the will of the
people. Although Congress and the President can exercise some con-
trol over administrative agencies, the sheer volume and complexity of
federal regulation inhibits effective checks by these branches.'8 For
this reason, it is important that if Congress desires to leave policies of
great significance to agencies, Congress must at least remain account-
able for the delegation if not for the policy decision itself. Decisions to
depart from well-established principles, such as the federal policy fa-
voring arbitration, should be traceable to the more politically ac-
countable legislature.'6'
The need for democratic accountability is only heightened by the
importance of the issue at stake. If Congress chooses to leave a sig-
nificant decision to the discretion of an agency, it should expressly
specify its intent to do so. Justice Scalia states that most statutory am-
biguities exist not because Congress intended a particular result or
meant to leave the decision to an agency, but because Congress did
not think about the matter at all."° To the extent that Scalia is right,
164 See David Schoenbrod, Power without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People
through Delegation 84-94 (Yale 1993) (arguing that agency delegation allows Congress to take
credit for successes while shifting blame for failures to agencies).
165 See Farina, 89 Colum L Rev at 499-511 (cited in note 162) (challenging the idea that
agencies are politically accountable entities and noting that the executive branch serves as the
primary source of supervision of agencies).
166 See id at 504 (noting that the President appoints major officers with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, and because the Senate rarely interferes, the President gains power through
handpicking bureaucrats).
167 See Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation at 317 (cited
in note 100) (noting that agencies are accountable not only to the executive, but also to the leg-
islature, which approves their leaders, amends the statutes they enforce, and establishes their
budgets).
168 Farina, 89 Colum L Rev at 508-10 (cited in note 162) (noting that while the President
has greater control than Congress over agencies, the huge magnitude of regulation will resist
comprehensive management even by the most formidable President).
169 See Sunstein, 67 U Chi L Rev at 335 (cited in note 128) (noting that -the nondelegation
canons are ... a species of judicial minimalism, indeed democracy-forcing minimalism, designed
to ensure that judgments are made by the democratically preferable institution").
170 See Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 517 (cited in note 87).
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administrative agencies that interpret statutory ambiguities as delega-
tions are not really acting according to congressional delegations of
authority, but rather are engaging in policymaking on their own initia-
tive.'71 This is especially troubling where the policy involved is an im-
portant one. It is almost impossible for Congress to think of every-
thing when it drafts a statute.'n Moreover, as discussed above, the vol-
ume and complexity of the regulatory state and Congress's heavy
workload makes it unlikely that Congress can catch and correct an
agency action every time it thinks the agency went too far.1
3
By requiring specificity from Congress to deviate from important
policies, courts ensure that these decisions are made in the "democ-
ratically preferable institution."' 7 Under this approach, it is Congress
that makes the choice, even if the choice itself is to delegate. Requir-
ing specificity helps erase the possibility that an agency will deviate
from well-accepted policies, such as arbitration, without some evi-
dence of deliberation from Congress.
4. Feasibility.
Congress can, and has, specifically exempted other statutes from
the reach of the FAA.1 75 For example, the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act provides that "[a]n agency may not require any per-
son to consent to arbitration.' 76 Another, the Convention on the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes Act of 1966, simply states that "[t]he
Federal Arbitration Act ... shall not apply to enforcement of awards
rendered pursuant to the convention.' 77 It would not be overly bur-
densome to require Congress to be just as specific when delegating
the decision to deviate from the FAA to an administrative agency.
Additionally, forcing Congress to be specific when it exempts a
statute from the FAA does little to undermine the efficiencies of the
administrative state, which lie primarily in allowing Congress to avoid
171 See Schoenbrod, Power without Responsibility at 16-19 (cited in note 164) (arguing that
Congress should not be allowed to delegate lawmaking authority to agencies because agencies
should not be allowed to make law).
172 See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum L Rev 673,699
(1997) (describing the textualist reliance on the authority of the executory institutions to fill in
the details of laws because "'no statute can be entirely precise,' and [ ] the elaboration of statu-
tory detail inevitably takes place outside the formal confines of bicameralism and present-
ment"), quoting Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361,415 (1989) (Scalia dissenting).
173 See Farina, 89 Colum L Rev at 508 (cited in note 162) (noting that the framers deliber-
ately placed practical constraints on Congress and the unforeseen shift of a significant portion
of lawmaking power from Congress to administrative agencies has resulted in an inability of
Congress "effectively or extensively to direct the policy making of its delegees").
174 Sunstein, 67 U Chi L Rev at 335 (cited in note 128).
175 See, for example, 5 USC § 575(a)(3) (1994); 22 USC § 1650a (1994).
176 5 USC § 575(a)(3).
177 22 USC § 1650a.
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immersion in legislative details by delegating responsibilities to agen-
cies with expertise in their respective fields. The decision to limit the
FAA, and even the decision to let the agency decide whether to limit
the FAA, however, is not a small detail. Rather, it is a determination
to depart from a well-established "body of federal substantive law of
arbitrability..'78 Deviation from the FAA is an important decision and
is one that Congress will not frequently make. Furthermore, by spe-
cifically prohibiting arbitration of other statutory claims, Congress has
shown that it can be explicit about this issue.'79 Finally, this approach
impacts the FTC's discretion only slightly,"' for the FTC is free to
regulate dispute resolution procedures under the MMWA in any way
it wants, so long as it does not run afoul of the FAA. Therefore, re-
quiring a specific statement from Congress when it chooses either to
deviate from the FAA itself, or allow an agency to do the same, is a
practical solution that does not undermine the benefit of efficiency
sought by the administrative state.
5. The legal nature of the FTC regulations.
A final reason for excluding the FTC regulations from the
McMahon inquiry is the legal nature of the regulations themselves. In
Chevron, the Supreme Court held that courts must defer to an
agency's legal interpretation of the statute it administers as long as
the interpretation is consistent with congressional intent and is rea-
sonable.'8' The FTC regulations present legal conclusions of a different
kind, however, in that the regulations attempt to resolve the conflict
between two federal statutes-one that it is charged with administer-
ing (the MMWA), and one that it is not (the FAA).
Typically, the legal conclusions that agencies draw are fairly lim-
ited to each agency's particular area of expertise. ' Thus, the MMWA
charges the FTC with the responsibility of regulating "informal dis-
pute settlement procedures"'83 involving MMWA claims, where the
agency's expertise in the area of consumer issues is valuable in estab-
lishing these rules. By interpreting the MMWA to prohibit binding
arbitration, however, the FTC does not merely decide how best to
administer the MMWA, but rather attempts to resolve a conflict be-
tween two federal statutes. In deciding this conflict against arbitration,
178 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corp, 460 US 1, 24 (1983).
179 See notes 175-77.
180 See Sunstein, 67 U Chi L Rev at 340-41 (cited in note 128) (noting that the use of non-
delegation canons only infringes on an agency's discretion in a "narrow, targeted way").
181 467 US at 842-44.
182 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. and William T. Mayton, Administrative Law 11-12 (West 1993)
(noting the importance of agency expertise in Congress's decision to delegate to an agency).
183 15 USC § 2310(a)(2).
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the FTC has conducted its own mini-McMahon inquiry, an area in
which courts clearly have greater expertise than the FTC. Thus, legal
issues like this one are better left to judges, whose sole function is to
interpret the law. After all, it is the province of the courts to "say what
the law is..'"
CONCLUSION
The FAA requires the enforcement of all arbitration agreements
except where Congress has specifically directed otherwise. Under
McMahon, courts consider three factors to determine whether Con-
gress has exempted a particular statute from application of the FAA:
the text of the statute, its legislative history, or whether there is an
"inherent conflict" between the purposes of the statute and arbitra-
tion.' Currently, courts are divided on whether the MMWA meets
McMahon's requirements and creates an exception to the FAA.86 The
primary reason for the conflict between courts is disagreement about
whether, and how, courts should consider FTC regulations prohibiting
arbitration of MMWA claims.
This Comment proposes that courts applying McMahon should
not consider the FTC regulations as evidence of Congress's intent to
bar arbitration of MMWA claims because the MMWA does not grant
the FTC the power to prohibit arbitration. First, the regulations are
not entitled to judicial deference under Chevron because they directly
conflict with Congress's intent to uphold arbitration agreements as
expressed in the FAA. Second, the MMWA does not change this re-
sult. Nothing in the MMWA's text, legislative history, or purposes ex-
pressly or implicitly authorizes the FTC's complete ban on binding
arbitration. Moreover, interpretation of the MMWA according to pre-
sumptions favoring arbitration and continuity in the law only con-
firms that the MMWA cannot be understood to authorize an excep-
tion to the FAA.
Requiring Congress to be explicit when it delegates to an agency
the decision whether to prohibit arbitration reduces decision and er-
ror costs for both courts and Congress and stimulates political ac-
countability and deliberation. Furthermore, the approach provides a
practical resolution to this and future conflicts between the FAA and
agency interpretations without undermining an agency's expertise in
administering a particular statute.
184 Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (noting that it is not only the duty
of the courts to apply the law, but also to interpret the law).
185 McMahon, 482 US at 227.
186 See note 13.
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